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Abstract
Background: Another influenza pandemic is all but inevitable. We estimated its potential impact
on the primary care medical workforce in New Zealand, so that planning could mitigate the
disruption from the pandemic and similar challenges.
Methods: The model in the "FluAid" software (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
CDC, Atlanta) was applied to the New Zealand primary care medical workforce (i.e., general
practitioners).
Results: At its peak (week 4) the pandemic would lead to 1.2% to 2.7% loss of medical work time,
using conservative baseline assumptions. Most workdays (88%) would be lost due to illness,
followed by hospitalisation (8%), and then premature death (4%).
Inputs for a "more severe" scenario included greater health effects and time spent caring for sick
relatives. For this scenario, 9% of medical workdays would be lost in the peak week, and 3% over
a more compressed six-week period of the first pandemic wave. As with the base case, most (64%)
of lost workdays would be due to illness, followed by caring for others (31%), hospitalisation (4%),
and then premature death (1%).
Conclusion: Preparedness planning for future influenza pandemics must consider the impact on
this medical workforce and incorporate strategies to minimise this impact, including infection
control measures, well-designed protocols, and improved health sector surge capacity.
Background
It is probably only a matter of time before the next influ-
enza pandemic. The only uncertainties are its timing and
impact. Effective planning for public health interventions
before and during a pandemic is likely to reduce its impact
[1]. A pandemic is likely to be extremely disruptive, partic-
ularly for the health sector. Not only will there be a surge
in demand for health services (preventive as well as cura-
tive), but the health workforce is likely to have higher
exposure and incidence rates.
We estimated for the impact of pandemic influenza on the
primary care medical workforce (i.e., general practition-
ers) for a single country – New Zealand. The estimates
inform planning for the pandemic as well as for other new
emerging infectious disease threats, including those from
Published: 11 August 2005
Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:7 doi:10.1186/1478-4491-3-7
Received: 02 December 2004
Accepted: 11 August 2005
This article is available from: http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/7
© 2005 Wilson et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:7 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/7
Page 2 of 6
(page number not for citation purposes)
bioterrorism, by providing some estimates for the level of
"surge capacity" that must be built into the health sector.
New Zealand has approximately 23 000 health practition-
ers plus around 30 000 support workers delivering serv-
ices in the community [2]. Around 40% of its medical
practitioners and 23% of its nurses work in primary care
settings. The population to general practitioner (GP) ratio
varies considerably across different territorial authorities
from about 450 to about 2300 [3]. New Zealand's Primary
Health Care Strategy [4], released in 2001, places primary
care at the centre of the country's health system. It defines
a future for primary care where, increasingly, primary care
and public health strategies are expected to be coordi-
nated and intermeshed, with the overall objective of
improving population health and reducing health
inequalities.
The Strategy led to the formation of new non-profit
umbrella organisations, called Primary Health Organisa-
tions (PHOs) [5]. PHOs are responsible for ensuring that
their constituent general practices and community organ-
isations provide comprehensive, continuing and coordi-
nated care to their enrolled populations, including health
promotion and prevention programmes. Increasingly,
PHOs are held accountable to their funders for a range of
population health outcomes. The development of PHOs
mirrors, to an extent, the development over the past five
years of primary care groups and trusts in the United King-
dom [6].
Methods
The FluAid model
The United States Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) have developed a relatively simple determin-
istic model, "FluAid" (on freely available software), for
analysing the impact of future influenza pandemics [7].
The output of the model is the number of deaths, hospi-
talisations, and illnesses requiring medical consultations
for a wave of pandemic influenza. These outputs were
used to estimate lost workdays in this analysis. The model
assumes that no public health interventions (e.g., limita-
tions of movement, vaccine, or antiviral drugs) are used to
control disease spread. Specific details on the FluAid soft-
ware and the various assumptions in the model are
detailed on the CDC website [8] and other documents
[9,10]. This model has been used in other studies [11-13].
Baseline model assumptions
The default values used in FluAid were used for the mor-
tality rates, the hospitalisation rates and the rates of ill-
ness. The default values for the incidence rates of clinical
illness were also used (i.e., 15% and 35% for "most likely"
results). Working doctors are likely to be in better health
than the general population (the "healthy worker effect"),
and have fewer risk factors associated with severe sequelae
from influenza infection. For example, they are probably
far less likely to have chronic respiratory disease, since
they have markedly lower smoking rates in New Zealand
than the rest of the population [14]. Therefore, the pro-
portion of doctors assumed to be in the "high-risk" cate-
gory was arbitrarily halved (i.e., from 14.4% for 19–64-
year-olds down to 7.2%). This may be overly conservative,
but we wished to systematically err towards underestimat-
ing the impact of a pandemic on this workforce in the
baseline model.
The length of time associated with hospitalisation (aver-
age of eight days) and from clinical illness (two days) was
based on the United States data in a previously published
model [10]. In addition to this, it was assumed that there
would be one day of convalescence for clinical illness and
three days convalescence after hospitalisation (i.e., before
returning to work). To determine the working days lost,
these figures were adjusted by the proportion of a typical
week that is spent at work (i.e., five out of seven days).
Population data
The latest available national figure for the total number of
registered medical practitioners working in primary care
was 3074 (i.e., those working four or more hours per week
in 2002 and who are classified as working in "general
practice" or "primary care") [15]. The average hours
worked per week by these doctors is 42 hours, and it was
assumed that they would work full time during the pan-
demic period (unless affected by illness).
Time distribution
The FluAid model does not consider the time frame of the
pandemic within an affected region. The length of influ-
enza epidemics is highly variable [16,17]. For the baseline
analysis the distribution of cases and a duration of eight
weeks was used, based on the results of a stochastically
simulated influenza pandemic [18].
"More severe" scenario assumptions
For this scenario the pandemic wave was assumed to last
only six weeks and the upper range "maximum" values
from the FluAid model were used (for the 35% incidence
rate scenario). The proportion of cases in the peak week
was raised to 40% (from 32.3%), the upper limit of the
days of hospitalisation was used (13 days [10]), and days
lost from illness was doubled relative to the baseline
model (i.e., to four days). In addition, it was assumed that
every doctor would spend an average of 0.5 days during
the pandemic wave period caring for sick relatives or
household members.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:7 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/7
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Results
Baseline assumptions result in 584 to 1320 lost workdays
for 15% and 35% incidence rates respectively (Table 1).
The lost work time was 1.2% to 2.7% of maximal capacity
at the time of estimated peak pandemic impact (week 4).
An estimated 88% of lost workdays arose from illness not
requiring hospitalisation, 8% from hospitalised cases, and
4% from deaths caused by influenza (when using the 35%
incidence rate).
The "more severe" model inputs resulted in 3591 lost
workdays (Table 2), with a loss of 9.3% of maximal capac-
ity in the peak week and 2.9% over the six-week period.
The lost workdays mainly arose from the impact of illness
not requiring hospitalisation (64%), then the time spent
caring for others (31%), the impact of hospitalisation
(4%), and then the impact of premature death (1%).
Discussion
Impact on health and workdays
The model results suggest a substantial impact on general
practitioners, even with very conservative assumptions.
For the "more severe" scenario a mortality rate of 65 per
100 000 is predicted (albeit for just one pandemic wave).
This is much less than the total population rate for the
1918 pandemic in New Zealand of 745 per 100 000 [19],
Table 1: Predicted impact of pandemic influenza on the population of active and registered primary care medical practitioners based 
on modelling with FluAid (n = 3074 doctors, 15% and 35% incidence rates)
Week of 
pandemic in 
NZ
Deaths 
(No.)
Hospital – 
isations 
(No.)
Illnesses 
(No.)a
Lost work-
days from 
deaths 
(No.)b
Lost 
workdays 
from 
hospitalisati
ons (No.)
Lost work-
days from 
illness 
(No.)a
Total lost 
workdays 
(No.)
Reduction 
in days 
worked (%)c
1 0.0 0 5 – 11 0 1 – 2 10 – 23 11 – 25 01 – 0.2%
2 0.1 1 26 – 61 1 5 – 11 56 – 130 62 – 142 0.4 – 0.9%
3 0.2 1 – 3 59 – 137 2 12 – 25 126 – 294 139 – 321 0.9 – 2.1%
4 0.3 2 – 4 77 – 180 3 15 – 33 165 – 386 184 – 422 1.2 – 2.7%
5 0.2 1 – 2 43 – 101 4 9 – 19 93 – 217 106 – 240 0.7 – 1.6%
6 0.1 1 – 1 20 – 47 5 4 – 9 44 – 101 52 – 115 0.3 – 0.7%
7 0.0 0 5 – 12 5 1 – 2 11 – 26 17 – 33 0.1 – 0.2%
8 0.0 0 3 – 7 5 1 7 – 16 12 – 22 0.1%
Totald 1 6 – 13 239 – 556 25 47 – 102 512 – 1192 584 – 1320 0.5 – 1.1%
aFor those with clinical illness that is severe enough to require a medical consultation – but which does not result in hospitalisation.
bThe impact is cumulative for deaths in terms of lost workdays.
cRelative to the full workforce working for five days per week.
dThe figures in the columns do not add up exactly to the totals due to rounding.
Table 2: Predicted impact of pandemic influenza on the population of active and registered primary care medical practitioners using 
"more severe" scenario assumptions and based on modelling with FluAid (n = 3074 doctors)
Week of 
pandemic 
in NZ
Deaths 
(No.)
Hospital-
isations 
(No.)
Illness 
(No.)a
Lost work-
days from 
deaths 
(No.)a
Lost 
workdays 
from 
hospitalisa
tions (No.)
Lost work-
days from 
illness 
(No.)a
Lost 
workdays 
from 
caring for 
others
Total lost 
workdays 
(No.)
Reduction 
in days 
worked 
(%)a
1 0.2 1 64 1 13 184 88 285 1.9%
2 0.4 3 161 3 32 459 220 713 4.6%
3 0.8 6 321 7 64 918 439 1428 9.3%
4 0.4 3 161 9 32 459 220 719 4.7%
5 0.2 1 64 10 13 184 88 294 1.9%
6 0.1 1 32 10 6 92 44 152 1.0%
Total* 2 14 803 39 160 2294 1098 3591 2.9%
aSee footnotes for Table 1.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:7 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/7
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but it is more than United States total population rates for
the 1957 Asian flu pandemic (22 per 100 000) and the
1968 Hong Kong flu pandemic (14 per 100 000) [20].
The results suggest that the major contributor to lost
workdays will be episodes of uncomplicated illness that
do not require hospitalisation. If time spent caring for sick
relatives is considered (i.e., as in the "more severe" sce-
nario) then this also made a substantial contribution to
the total workdays lost. The impact of lost workdays will
be magnified by the increased demand on the medical
workforce, as has recently been modelled for primary care
consultations and hospitalisations in New Zealand [12],
and for critical care services in both New Zealand and Aus-
tralia [21].
Implications for the health sector
There are several broad strategies to reduce the impact of
an influenza pandemic on health care workers. First,
infection control strategies aimed at doctors need to be in
place. These measures include basic hygiene practices and
also mask use may be appropriate (depending on risk
[1]). Health authorities and doctors themselves could also
stockpile and then use antivirals at the appropriate time.
Such stockpiling has already commenced at a national
level in New Zealand and various other countries [22].
Recent modelling work indicates that access to enough
antivirals could substantially reduce the number of clini-
cal cases and hospitalisations in the population [23].
Second, pandemic planning needs to include specific
measures to maintain the functional capacity of health
care workers, bearing in mind that the impact of an influ-
enza pandemic is likely to vary between urban and rural
areas. While exposure to infection may be less in relatively
isolated rural areas, such areas generally have far less
"spare" health care capacity, should GPs be incapacitated.
General practices and health authorities can consider
plans to provide care for the ill dependents of their medi-
cal staff so as to reduce absenteeism rates. Through other
pandemic planning activities they can also potentially
reduce the overall impact of a pandemic and hence
demands on their staff. For example, rapid action at the
start of the pandemic to cancel elective procedures could
enhance workforce capacity. Establishing dedicated pri-
mary care assessment centres for patients with suspected
influenza could also reduce overall GP workload.
Third, strategies are needed to manage the psychological
impact of pandemic influenza on health care workers.
Surveys of such workers show that they report a lower
willingness to report for duty for infectious diseases epi-
demics (SARS, smallpox) than for most other forms of cat-
astrophic disasters (environmental disasters, mass
casualty incidents) [24]. Experience with SARS also dem-
onstrated the psychological importance of having well-
designed policies and protocols in place. Even in situa-
tions where health care workers perceive themselves to be
at increased risk, they report feeling reassured by simple
protective measures based on sound epidemiological
principles, when implemented in a timely manner [25]. A
review of the foundations for a SARS preparedness and
response plan has specifically highlighted the importance
of both appropriate staffing and support [26].
Fourth, improving health sector surge capacity now would
be desirable as the New Zealand health sector is often run-
ning at stretched capacity (e.g., especially emergency
departments [27]). Expanding existing services such as the
"Healthline" (a free telephone information service to the
public staffed by nurses) may also be worthwhile. Simi-
larly, active promotion of key websites with information
on managing influenza (e.g., as per the CDC website [28])
could be publicised each winter season. All such measures
would benefit the public prior to a pandemic as well as
potentially reducing the demands on the medical work-
force in the primary care and secondary care settings dur-
ing a pandemic.
Finally, a greater focus on the primary care nursing work-
force would be of benefit. Following the implementation
of the Primary Health Care Strategy there has been a rapid
shift to capitation funding of general practices, and an
attendant increased focus on team-based primary care
(principally GPs and practice nurses). This trend raises the
possibility of increasing substitution of GP work roles by
nurses. This type of substitution has occurred for a decade
or more in a range of community-governed non-profit
practices and other capitation-funded practices [29,30]. A
recent review of the medical workforce in New Zealand
also highlights the potential efficiencies from some role
shifting from doctors to other health workers [31].
Expanding such a non-medical health workforce, while
also vulnerable to the infection during a pandemic, would
provide a buffer for the GP workforce in the event of attri-
tion of GP capacity.
Limitations with the modelling
The uncertainties associated with pandemic influenza
mean that estimating its future impact is problematic.
This model could substantially underestimate the true
impact because the new strain may be particularly infec-
tious and/or virulent, and the incidence rate for clinical
illness might be higher for doctors given their likely occu-
pational risk [32]. For example, one review of nosocomial
outbreaks reported a health care worker incidence rate to
be as high as 60% [33]. Furthermore, doctors may be rel-
atively slow to seek care for themselves – especially at the
time of a national crisis when their professional obliga-
tions are greatest. Other parameters used in the modellingHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:7 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/7
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may also have been overly conservative, such as the extent
of the healthy worker effect among doctors and the
amount of time off work taken to care for sick relatives
(which was zero in the baseline model and fairly small at
0.5 days in the "more severe" scenario). There was also no
consideration in the model of absenteeism effects from
fear of infection (e.g., in the case of particularly virulent
strains). Indeed, this absenteeism effect could be more
important than actual disease in reducing health sector
capacity.
Although we consider that the baseline results are more
likely to underestimate than to overestimate the impact of
a future influenza pandemic, there are still plausible rea-
sons why they could be overestimates. These include the
following:
• various international and national public health inter-
ventions (as recommended by WHO [1]) may reduce the
impact of pandemic influenza;
• at least for subsequent pandemic waves, an appropriate
vaccine may be available;
• antivirals could prevent infection and reduce morbidity
amongst the medical workforce and the rest of the popu-
lation [23];
• improved treatment could lower hospitalisation and
mortality rates (relative to the figures used in this model).
Further research
This modelling could be further refined to address some
of the limitations detailed above. Clarifying the preva-
lence of "high-risk" conditions among the medical work-
force would be a particularly important refinement along
with improving the estimates of time off work to care for
relatives (or even absenteeism from fear of infection).
Expanding such modelling to other parts of the health sec-
tor workforce is also desirable, along with exploring the
extent that such research is generalisable to other threats
(e.g., from other new emerging infectious threats, includ-
ing those from bioterrorism).
Summary
This modelling work has a number of limitations and so
these results could still substantially overestimate or
underestimate the impact of the next influenza pandemic
on the primary care medical workforce. Nevertheless, this
modelling work highlights the importance of infection
control strategies for health care workers, pandemic plan-
ning, and improving current health sector surge capacity.
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